ABSTRACT Oblivious transfer (OT) is the most fundamental process in cryptosystems and serves as the basic building block for implementing protocols, such as the secure multi-party computation and the fair electronic contract. However, since most implementations of the Internet of Things are time-sensitive, existing works that are based on traditional public cryptosystems are not efficient or secure under quantum machine attacks. In this paper, we argued that the fastest known 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT 1 n ) protocol, which was proposed by Chou, cannot achieve semantic security and is time-consuming due to exponent arithmetic of large parameters. Utilizing NTRUEncrypt and OT extension, we devised a one-round postquantum secure OT 1 n protocol that is also proved to be active and adaptively secure under the universal composability framework. Compared with Chou's protocol, the computational overheads of our scheme are approximately 6 and 1.7 times smaller on the sender and receiver sides, in line with the standard security level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the proliferation of IoT, security issues remain the primary bottleneck for its extensive application [1] - [3] . Until now, no mature cryptographic processes have been sufficiently competent in balancing the relationship between diverse security requirements and efficient applications [4] - [6] . Therefore, we strive to devise a universally practicable building block for secure IoT implementation in accordance with oblivious transfer.
Oblivious transfer, which was introduced as conjugate coding [7] , was named by Rabin [8] . Among the many flavors of OT, such as original oblivious transfer, 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT 1 2 ) and k-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT k n ), 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer has been extensively studied in the literature due to its incomparability to private information retrieval (PIR). To our surprise, this extraordinarily basic process [9] can perform any cryptographic task. OT 1 n is also known as all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets (ANDOS), owing to its formal definition, which is stated in the Table 1 below. Definition 1: A 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol is a two-party interactive function F OT that is executed by a sender (S) and a receiver (R) and is described as Herein, M represents the message space that contains the sender's data set, while the exact message that the receiver wishes to learn is indicated by τ . The interactive function F OT also imposes the following requirements, which shape the completeness of OT 1 n . a. Correctness: if both R and S follow the protocol, R will learn the correct m τ after interacting with S; b. Receiver's privacy: Even if S deviates from the protocol, she cannot obtain any information about R's choice τ ; c. Sender's privacy: Even if R deviates from the protocol, she is not allowed to obtain any message or combination of messages except m τ .
The security notion that captures the above requirements can be testified as full simulation ability, which was proposed by Camenisch et al. [10] in 2007 and hints at the indistinguishability between an ideal scenario and a real scenario with respect to any probabilistic poly-time adversary, as shown below. 1 indicates that for any communication environment Z , if there exists an ideal attacker Sim and a trusted third party F that correspond to the adversary A and OT protocol π , respectively, in the real world, the view of A is limited as follows:
Then, π is proved to be a secure implementation of OT. Since 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer proved to be a fundamental process in many cryptographic applications, such as hidden access control in cloud, simultaneous contract signing and multi-party computation [11] , its efficiency is as important as the security. Although an OT 1 n protocol can be built from OT 1 2 by invoking the basis n or log 2 n times [12] - [14] , it is preferable to implement it directly by means of advanced techniques [15] - [33] .
Based on universally composable model, Green and Hohenberger [15] and Jarecki and Liu [16] designed adaptive OT protocols in terms of the q-hidden LRSW assumption and the q-DHI assumption, respectively. Although Kurosawa and Nojima [17] proposed a more explicit scheme, which was not q-based, it was impracticable because of the large communication burden [18] . Soon afterwards, Kurosawa et al. [19] revised their scheme by utilizing a verifiable shuffle protocol and reduced the communication cost to O (1) . They also summarized their ideas as an adaptive OT construction on any well-known assumption [20] .
Since the security model of OT is comprehensively constructed and since its efficiency is closely related to practical scenarios, recent research has intensively focused on efficient instantiations regarding computation and communication costs [21] - [37] . Until now, the most wellknown OT protocol that attained UC-security against both active and adaptive corruptions was that of [28] . Since this protocol is achieved by simply tweaking the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange basis over twisted Edwards curve, the scheme reduced the computational cost to n+6 exponentiations (3 for the receiver and n + 3 for the sender) and the communication burden to 2 group elements and n × l-byte ciphertexts for 1-out-of-n OT, where l represents the length of each ciphertext e i , for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. To demonstrate the performance improvements of our approach, we describe Chou's protocol in detail as follows [28] , and summarize in Table 2 .
Despite the simplicity of Chou's protocol, we argue that there are two defects with respect to its security and efficiency:
a. Although the corrupted receiver is incapable of deriving y from S due to the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP), she can forge the message R as R = τ S and can query the oracle E k τ −1 (·) with e τ −1 in an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. After acquiring plaintext m τ −1 , she is able to simply determine whether y = y by checking whether E H (y ·S) (m τ −1 ) = e τ −1 holds for any y ∈ G. Furthermore, supposing that the cyclic group G is bilinear, e.g., a super singular elliptic curve, the receiver can trivially distinguish y from y by comparingê g, y g withê g , S , where g is another generator of cyclic group G andê stands for a bilinear mapping. Thus, we claim that Chou's protocol is not secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
b. It is universally known that the security of cryptographic implementations that are based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is limited when parameters are large. That is, the aforementioned protocol is still time-consuming under resource-constrained circumstances due to O (n) exponential operations.
To eliminate the two defects of Chou's protocol, we utilize NTRUEncrypt for OT 1 n realization. The basic strategy of our scheme is that we exploit the irreversibility of various polynomials and a fail-stop model to avert both active and adaptive corruptions, while the computation and communication burdens are reduced due to convolutional polynomial multiplication and OT extension.
We briefly summarize our contributions as follows: 1. Due to the bilinearity of the cyclic group, the fastest known 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol, which was proposed by Chou et. al., is not semantically secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH). 2. For the first time, we introduced a lattice-based cryptographic primitive, namely, NTRUEncrypt, into an OT 1 n implementation. The devised scheme is proved to be post-quantum secure and resistant to active adaptive attacks under the UC framework. 3. Thanks to the OT extension technology and efficient convolution polynomial multiplication, our protocol requires only 1 round of interaction and the computational overhead of the sender/receiver is approximately 6/1.7 times smaller compared to Chou's protocol, which is in line with the standard security level. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section II, we first present preliminary results regarding NTRUEncrypt and the condition for its correctness. Then, an essential 1-out-of-n oblivious protocol is presented, followed by its complete implementation in section III. Section IV proves the security of our scheme under the universal composability framework, while its performances are evaluated in comparison with Chou's protocol. Finally, we present the conclusions of the paper in section V.
II. PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF NTRUEncrypt
The OT 1 n protocol that is devised in this paper is structured on the NTRUEncrypt system due to its linearity and resistance to quantum machines. The NTRU encryption algorithm works on a polynomial ring
, where the polynomial degree is less than N :
Since only simple convolutional polynomial multiplications are needed for both encryption and decryption, NTRU outperforms other asymmetric cryptosystems, such as RSA, ElGamal and elliptic curve cryptography. According to the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Leuven [38] , a throughput of up to 200,000 encryptions per second can be reached at a security level of 256 bits by a GTX280 GPU. Compared to a symmetric cipher, this is only approximately 20 times slower than a recent AES implementation [39] .
Similar to the prime decomposition problem that is exploited by RSA, the security of NTRUEncrypt relies on the hardness of factoring a reducible polynomial, which is equivalent to lattice reduction. Thus, it is infeasible to usurp the secret key if the parameters are chosen sufficiently securely.
For each system, three integer parameters, namely, (N , p, q), are specified, where p and q are two moduli that truncate the ring R as
. It is always assumed that N and p are prime, while q is coprime to both q and N . To prove the correctness of our protocols, a polynomial set T(d 1 , d 2 ) is specified by two parameters that are defined in advance:
Definition 2: For any positive integers d 1 and d 2 ,
In the key generation phase, the receiver randomly chooses two covert polynomials that satisfy
and compute
If any of the inverses does not exist, she has to go back and try another f (x). After that, she computes and distributes her public key as
while keeping the private key (f (x) , f p (x)) secret.
To encrypt a message m, the sender represents it as a binary or ternary string and puts it in the form of a polynomial m (x) VOLUME 6, 2018 whose coefficients belong to [−p/2, p/2]. Then, she samples a random polynomial r(x) from T(d, d) and computes
as the ciphertext. After obtaining the ciphertext e(x), the receiver computes
and lift its coefficients to the interval [−q/2, q/2] to achieve the plaintext as
We claim that the correctness of the NTRU encryption algorithm can be guaranteed in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: If the parameters of the NTRU cryptosystem (Enc, Dec) satisfy
the receiver can accurately recover ciphertext e (x). Proof: Since
by formula (8), the maximal parameter of any g(x) · r(x) can be computed as
where g i and r j are coefficients of the ith and jth orders in g(x) and r(x), respectively. It is concluded that the coefficients of g (x) · r (x) are at most 2d 2 , while the parameters of f (x) · m(x) are no more than p(2d +1)/2. Accordingly, the maximal parameter of formula (12) will never exceed p(2d 2 +d +1/2). If p(4d 2 + 2d + 1) < q, all the parameters of (11) can be lifted to [−q/2, q/2] without losing any information. Thus, by computing
the plaintext can be accurately recovered. Since the parameters are always small in polynomials g (x) , r(x) and f (x), the maximal parameter of formula (12) is generally logarithmically related to dp. For example, if we simply choose the coefficients of these polynomials from {−1, 0, 1}, the inequality in formula (1) can be relaxed to
III. ONE-OUT-OF-N OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER BASED ON NTRUEncrypt
Due to the capability of withstanding Shor's algorithm-based attacks and the commendable performance, we utilize the NTRU cryptosystem as the main building block to structure a novel OT 1 n protocol, together with the following primitives: Symmetric cryptosystem: A non-committing and robust symmetric encryption algorithm (E, D) is used to conceal the messages.
Hash function: A hash function H :
ω is used to derive a ω-bit key from a polynomial in truncated ring R q = (Z /qZ ) [x] /(x N −1) for symmetric encryption.
Our 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer scheme is divided into two parts: first, we present an essential protocol by which the receiver can secretly obtain one of n random keys from the sender; then, the above primitive is combined with OT extension to complete the OT 1 n . The essential protocol is described in Table 3 . For clarity, the suffixes (x) of the polynomials are left out, and they are represented as vectors of the coefficients.
During the essential oblivious transfer process, all the operations are executed under modulo q, except for c 1 S and c 2 S decryption. Thus, we claim the correctness of the aforementioned protocol in the following lemma: Lemma 2: If both parties are honest and q > p 4d 3 + 2d + 1 (or q > p(8d 2 + 2d + 1), when the coefficients of g (x) and r(x) are chosen from {−1, 0, 1}), the polynomial c τ S is equivalent to c τ R modulo q. Proof: Since q > p(4d 3 + 2d + 1), the receiver can trivially compute r 1 S and r 2 S by her private key. Then, she calculates c R = p · r R ·r S ·g S +p·τ ·h S (mod q) after recovering r S and r S · g S using the extended Euclidean algorithm. When i = τ , the sender can compute c τ S = c S − τ · r S · f Sq (mod q), where c S = r R · (r S ) 2 + τ · r S · f Sq . Thus, the corresponding polynomial that she obtains is c τ R = r R · (r S ) 2 (mod q) at the end of the protocol.
However, the parameter d is quadratically or even cubically related to q, which makes the efficiency and security difficult to balance. To ensure the practicability of our protocol, we revisit the sampling process of r S and g s to alleviate the parameter requirements, as follows.
Since ϕ S is irreversible, the randomness and invariability of r S are preserved. Since the coefficients of g S and ϕ S are chosen from {−1, 0, 1}, the maximal parameters of a 1
S are p(2d + 3)/2 and p(6d +1)/2, respectively. Similar to the coefficient lifting requirement in section II, the inequality of Lemma 2 can be eased to
Hitherto, we combine the essential OT 1 n protocol with hash and symmetric encryption primitives to complete the scheme.
The proof of the correctness of this scheme is straightforward since the symmetric keys H (c i S ) and H c τ R are the same according to Lemma 2. 
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IV. UC SECURITY
We argue that our scheme is secure under the universal composability framework. More precisely, each computationally unbounded adversary is incapable of revealing any information, as stipulated by the OT 1 n functionality, seen in Tables 4  and 5 . The adaptive attacking model is defined as follows: Adversary model: Assume that H (·), D k (·), Dec sk (·) as well as F r (·) are oracles, where g = F r (r ·g), and there exists an authenticated but not confidential channel to avoid identity forgery between the parties. Any corrupted sender or receiver can query the oracle polynomial times, while both malicious sides may preserve all the information about previous repeats as well.
To put aside many of the implementation details and to reach the core of our protocol, two lemmas are presented:
Lemma 3: No computationally unbounded sender on input c R can guess τ with probability greater than 1/n.
Proof:
S (mod q), polynomial τ + r R · r S · f S (mod q) may be exposed to the sender. Nevertheless, because r R is randomly sampled from R q in the random oracle model, she is ignorant of any information about τ as well. In our scheme, the sender should compute:
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} without knowing r R . Thus,
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Now, we describe how to combine the essential protocol with an appropriate hash function and a symmetric cryptographic scheme to complete the OT 1 n . To demonstrate that a real-world implementation of our scheme is indistinguishable from its simulation, the ideal functionality is first defined as follows:
Definition 3: The ideal functionality F − OT (n, 1, l) receives an index τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} from the receiver R and a vector of l-bit messages m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n from the sender S but only outputs an l-bit string z to the receiver R.
Then, we encapsulate our setups to model the real functionality F OT (n, 1, l) and to compare it to the simulation results, as shown in Table 6 and 7. For clarity, we labeled these steps according to Table 3 . The messages that are received by corrupted parties (A S and A D ) or their corresponding simulators (Sim S and Sim D ) are marked with superscripts ∼, while the ceilings − are used to differentiate the parameters from their authentic counterparts. Tables 6 and 7 indicate that the information that an adversary learned by attacking our protocol is indistinguishable from what can be computed by a simulator that only interacts with the ideal functionality. Therefore, we claim the following:
Theorem 1: Our protocol securely implements the functionality F − OT (n, 1,l) if the symmetric encryption scheme (E, D) is non-committing and the hash function F perfectly models a random oracle.
Proof: According to Lemma 3 and Table 6 ,
the receiver's privacy can be achieved. Due to the non-committing and random oracle properties of (E, D) and F, the distribution of k i or m i is identical between F OT (n, 1, l) and F − OT (n, 1, l). By Lemma 4 and Table 7 , we have
and where |M | stands for the size of the plaintext space. Therefore, our protocol preserves the sender's data ownership as well.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare our protocol with the fastest known implementation of OT 1 n [28] . The parameters of r S and g S are sampled according to Table 4 . Both protocols require only 1 round of interaction for key exchange, where timing attacks are averted by exploiting the high-level strategy, as in [40] . Since our scheme is based on the NTRU cryptosystem, which uses only simple polynomial multiplication, its operations are very fast compared to other asymmetric cryptographic systems.
To simulate Chou's protocol, the existing Curve25519 implementation [38] is modified to perform scalar multiplications on the twisted Edwards curve [41] . The set of points in cyclic group G are represented as
According to the latest research on NTRUEncrypt [42] , the parameters summarized in Table 8 , are considered secure: Thus, we choose the standard and highest security level for comparison.
Without loss of impartiality, the experiments are performed on an Intel Core i3-2330M processor (Sandy Bridge), where each party runs on one core. The computational burden and communication overhead for each essential OT 1 n is estimated by averaging over 500 tests.
According to Table 9 , our protocol outperforms Chou's scheme on both the sender and receiver sides, even when the highest level of security is considered. Although the key generation phase is avoided in Chou's scheme, according to section IV, the security of our protocol would not be compromised if we carried out such a step only once among all iteration. In contrast, since Chou's protocol is not secure under VOLUME 6, 2018 the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, the sender must resample y and recompute S and T every iteration, despite that they can be regarded as her key pair. To provide postquantum security as in our scheme, the super singular isogeny Diffie-Hellman key exchange process can be employed by Chou's protocol. However, this process exploits much of the same field arithmetic as existing elliptic curve cryptography approaches and requires computational overhead that is similar to many currently used public key systems [43] . Table 10 compares the communication burden between our proposed scheme and Chou's protocol. Although the communication load of our scheme is higher than that of Chou's protocol due to the many polynomial coefficients, it is independent of the number of messages and is O (1) . Thus, the traffic volume in essential OT 1 n is acceptable compared with the data size of the ciphertexts.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Aiming at active and adaptive corruption resistance, a novel 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol that is based on NTRUEncrypt is presented. We note that Chou's protocol is defective in both security and efficiency aspects, although it is the fastest known implementation of OT 1 n . Utilizing OT extension and polynomial multiplication with optimized coefficients, our proposed scheme achieves low computational overhead. In addition, our security analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme preserves the privacy of both the sender and receiver sides against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2) under the UC framework.
